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The Debate over the State
of U.S. Manufacturing
How the Computer Industry Affects the
Numbers and Perceptions

S

ince 2000, the U.S. manufacturing
sector has lost 5.5 million jobs, or
about a third of its employment base. In
response to these employment losses, a
large trade deficit in manufactured goods,
and concerns that U.S. manufacturing is
losing its international competitiveness,
President Obama recently announced the
creation of a new cabinet-level Office of
Manufacturing Policy.
The administration’s move to develop
policies promoting U.S. manufacturing
has many detractors, however. At the heart
of the debate over the appropriate policy
response is a basic disagreement over the
actual state of U.S. manufacturing. Those
who oppose government intervention
typically argue there is little need.
They point to robust output growth
in manufacturing that, except during
recessions, has outpaced average annual
growth of the U.S. economy for decades.
Employment losses, it is argued, are
largely a consequence of extraordinary
productivity growth, which in turn reflects
automation, not import competition. The
U.S. manufacturing sector is healthy,
according to this view. There is little or
nothing to fix.1
The purpose of this article is to help
reconcile the apparently contradictory
sets of statistics that are brought to the
debate. In particular, I argue that the
aggregate manufacturing output and

productivity statistics so commonly cited
are widely misinterpreted.
Aggregate statistics mask quite
divergent trends within manufacturing.
The rapid output and productivity
growth of the manufacturing sector is
largely attributable to one small industry:
computers and electronic products.
For most of manufacturing, output
growth has been relatively weak and
productivity growth modest. In addition,
the extraordinary output growth in the
U.S. computer industry does not signal
U.S. competitiveness in manufacturing
computer and electronic products, and
productivity growth has not caused
the steep employment declines in this
industry.
Different Statistics
Paint Different Pictures
Output statistics such as those
depicted in Figure 1 paint a rosy picture
of the U.S. manufacturing sector. The
figure, which plots indexes of real (priceadjusted) GDP and manufacturing value
added from 1997 to 2011, shows that,
except during recessions, growth in
manufacturing real value added outpaced
growth in real GDP. Over the entire time
period, manufacturing output growth was
greater than that of GDP.
In spite of its strong output growth,
manufacturing employment has been
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Figure 1 Growth in Real GDP and Manufacturing Value Added, 1997–2011
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declining as a share of nonfarm payroll
employment since the 1970s (Figure 2).
The divergent output and employment
trends are typically explained by the
fact that labor productivity growth in
manufacturing has also greatly outpaced
that in the aggregate economy. From
this perspective, recent employment
declines in manufacturing seem part of
a long-term trend. Numerous analysts
have made analogies between the

manufacturing sector and agriculture,
which has experienced high output
growth, but supports few jobs owing
to the automation of farming. (See, for
example, Reich [2009], Executive Office
of the President [2009], and Roxburgh et
al. [2012].)
A closer look at the manufacturing
employment numbers, however, reveals
a clear break in trend since 2000. Figure
2, which also plots manufacturing

Figure 2 Manufacturing Employment, Number and as Percent of Nonfarm Payroll
Employment, 1970-2011
21,000

30

% of nonfarm employment

17,000
20

15,000
13,000

15

11,000

10

% of nonfarm employment
Manufacturing employees

9,000

5

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

2

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1978

1976

1974

1972

1970

0

7,000
5,000

Thousands of employees

19,000

25

employment levels from 1970 to the
present, shows that manufacturing
employment was relatively stable or
experienced modest trend declines until
2000.2 From 2000 to 2002 manufacturing
employment fell by 2 million, or 12
percent, and during the ensuing economic
upturn, manufacturing employment
continued to fall; this marked the first
time manufacturing employment failed to
rebound following a recession. Over the
decade from 2000 to 2010, manufacturing
employment declined by 5.7 million,
or one-third. The sudden and sharp
employment losses in the manufacturing
sector are hard to fully square with a
story about productivity improvements
driven by automation. And although press
reports have heralded manufacturing’s
employment gains in the last year, they
are small compared to its losses during
the Great Recession. Today, nonfarm
payroll employment is 96 percent of what
it was in 2007, immediately prior to the
start of the recession; manufacturing
employment is just 87 percent.
Trade statistics also give cause
for concern about the state of U.S.
manufacturing. Eighteen of the 19
industries in the manufacturing sector run
sizable trade deficits, according to data
published by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis; that is, the United States
imports more than it exports in these
industries’ product categories. Moreover,
between 1998 (the first year that these
industry-level data are published) and
2007, the ratio of net exports (exports less
imports) to domestic use of an industry’s
products worsened. This implies that
domestic manufacturing output failed
to keep pace with domestic use of
manufactured goods. The picture has
been more mixed since 2007, reflecting
the worldwide recession, but apparel,
textiles, furniture, autos, electrical
appliances, and computers continued to
show a loss of competitiveness by this
metric.
What Accounts for Manufacturing’s
High Output Growth?
Manufacturing’s strong growth in
real value added seems at odds with
the weak employment numbers and
trade performance. These apparently
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Figure 3 Average Annual Growth
Rates of Real Value Added in
Computers and Manufacturing
without Computers
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aggregate manufacturing statistics.
Without the computer industry,
manufacturing real value-added growth
has been much weaker than overall
growth in the economy (Figure 4).3 The
computer industry has a similarly large
impact on the aggregate manufacturing
productivity statistics. For example,
manufacturing multifactor productivity
growth rates between 1997 and 2007
fall by almost half when the computer
industry is excluded (Houseman et al.
2011).
The growth rates in Figures 3 and
4 are based on published data. In
addition, the sizable growth of imported
intermediates used in manufacturing has
likely imparted a significant bias to real
value added in the published statistics
for all manufacturing industries. This
bias arises because the price declines
associated with the shift in sourcing
to low-cost countries are not properly
captured, which in turn results in an
underestimation of the real growth in
imports and an overestimation of the
growth in real value added produced
domestically. Accounting for offshoring
bias, the average annual growth rate
in real value added for manufacturing
excluding computers was well under
1 percent between 1997 and 2007
(Houseman et al. 2011).
What Accounts for the Extraordinary
Growth in Real Value Added and
Productivity in the Computer Industry
and What Does It Mean?
Is the computer and electronic
products industry, which includes
computers, semiconductors, and
telecommunications equipment, the
bright spot in American manufacturing?
Not necessarily. Although some computer
and electronics products companies
headquartered in the United States are
highly successful in product innovation
and are competitive in international
markets, the United States does not
produce high-volume products in
this industry anymore (Sturgeon and
Kawakami 2010). And trade statistics
cited above indicate that domestic
production has not kept pace with
consumption, leading to a widening trade
deficit in these products.

Figure 4 Average Annual Growth
Rates of Real GDP and
Manufacturing Value Added
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contradictory trends can be reconciled
to a large degree by the fact that the
manufacturing output statistics mask
divergent trends within the manufacturing
sector.
Figure 3 shows average annual growth
in real value added for the computers
and electronic products industry and for
manufacturing excluding the computer
industry from 1997 to 2007 (the decade
leading up to the Great Recession)
and from 2000 to 2010 (a period that
incorporates the recession). Real value
added in the computer industry grew at
a staggering rate of 22 percent per year
from 1997 to 2007 and 16 percent per
year from 2000 to 2010. In contrast,
average annual growth of real value
added in the rest of manufacturing was
just 1.2 percent per year from 1997 to
2007; real value added in the rest of
manufacturing was actually about 6
percent lower in 2010 than at the start of
the decade.
Although the computer and electronics
products industry only accounted for
10–12 percent of value added in the
manufacturing sector throughout the
period, it has an outsized effect on
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What accounts then for the rapid
growth in real value added in this
industry? At least part of the explanation
concerns the adjustment of price
indexes used to deflate computers and
semiconductors for improvements in
quality. Computers and semiconductors
are much more powerful today than they
were a decade or even a year or two ago.
Although product price indexes typically
increase over time, for computers
and semiconductors they have fallen
rapidly. Largely reflecting adjustments
by statistical agencies to account for
the increased power of computers and
semiconductors, the price indexes used
to adjust shipments of computers and
semiconductors have fallen at a rate
of 21 percent and 13 percent per year,
respectively, from 1998 to 2010. Such
rapid price drops imply, for example, that
for the same dollar value of computer
shipments, the quality-adjusted quantity
(real value) is 13 times higher in 2010
than in 1998.4
The rapid growth in real output
coupled with a sharp drop in employment
has led to surging productivity in the
computer industry. But has productivity
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growth caused these employment
declines? Analysts often interpret
productivity growth to mean that workers
are working faster or that automation
(the substitution of capital for labor)
is driving the growth, as illustrated
in a recent White House report on
manufacturing: “Manufacturing workers
have paradoxically often been the victims
of their sector’s own success, as rapid
productivity growth has meant that goods
can be produced with fewer workers”
(Executive Office of the President 2009).
Underpinning the computer industry’s
rapid productivity growth, however, are
price deflators that, when adjusted for
quality improvements, are rapidly falling.
The productivity growth in the computer
industry largely reflects research and
development innovations, and product
improvements do not cause job losses.
Today’s computer may be in some
statistical sense the equivalent of, say, 13
computers in 1998, but that does not, in
and of itself, mean that fewer workers are
needed to manufacture a computer today
than in the past. In fact, job losses in the
computer industry are attributable to the
shift of electronics product manufacturing
to Asia (see, for example, Roxburgh et al.
2012).
Conclusion
Strong output and productivity
statistics have led many to dismiss outof-hand concerns about the international
competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing.
The computer and electronics products
industry, however, is driving these high
growth rates in the aggregate statistics,
despite the fact that this industry accounts
for only about 10 percent of the sector’s
value added and employment. The
irony is that high output growth in the
computer industry is a poor metric of
the competitiveness of U.S. factories in
making computer and related electronic
products. The manufacturing of these
products has largely moved to Asia.
Competition from foreign suppliers, not
high productivity growth, is responsible
for the sharp employment declines in the
computer industry.
Understanding the international
competitiveness of manufacturing and
the consequences of import competition
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for workers and businesses is critical for
developing sound manufacturing policy.
As a start, analysts and policymakers
should recognize that the aggregate
output and productivity statistics are not
representative of what is happening in
most of manufacturing.
Notes
1. See, for example, Kevin Hasset, http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-16/
obama-s-obsession-drives-progress-inreverse-commentary-by-kevin-hassett.html
and Mark J. Perry, http://blog.american.
com/2012/02/u-s-manufacturing-is-alreadydoing-remarkably-well-without-taxpayerhelp/. Atkinson et al. (2012, pp. 24–25)
includes citations to many other prominent
analysts and policymakers promoting this
view.
2. The modest declines in manufacturing
employment during the 1990s can be
accounted for entirely by manufacturers’
increased use of staffing industry workers,
who are not counted as manufacturing
employees. Although in official statistics
manufacturing employment declined by
4.1 percent from 1989 to 2000, taking
into account temporary help and other
staffing workers assigned to manufacturing,
employment rose by an estimated 1.3 percent
(Dey, Houseman, and Polivka forthcoming).
3. The reason this fact is not more widely
known may have to do with the way the
statistics are published. In the late 1990s, the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, along with
the other U.S. statistical agencies, introduced
the use of chained aggregates. Although
BEA publishes value added in “real chained
dollars” for all individual manufacturing
industries, these industry-level real chained
dollars cannot be summed to create a real
series for subsets of industries. Growth rates
for industry subsets may be approximated
using a Törnqvist formula that uses both
real and nominal value-added industry data.
Specifically, the growth rate of real valueadded for a subset of industries, expressed as
a logarithmic change, is approximately equal
to the weighted average of the growth rates of
the component industries,
ln(Qt / Qt 1 ) | ¦ wi ,t ln(qi ,t / qi ,t 1 )
i

where qi,t is the published real dollar or
(equivalently) quantity index for industry i
in year t and wi,t is the average of industry i’s
share of nominal value added in adjacent time
periods (t, t − 1); ¦wit = 1.
i

4. The statistics for the computer and
electronics products industry also may be
subject to significant measurement error, in
addition to that discussed above. This industry
has been characterized by rapid shifts in the
sourcing of production and the development
of global production chains that are difficult to
capture in our statistical system, as currently
designed. Such measurement error is the
subject of on-going research supported by a
Sloan Foundation grant that I am codirecting.
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